IV. Mitigating Threats to Voting Integrity
A. Internet Voting
1. Eminent computer security scientists at organizations like NIST (see www.cfvi.us for Essential Election Integrity Documents) say that the present Internet’s architecture cannot be made secure for public elections, despite claims to the contrary. The appearance of the University of Michigan Fight Song on Washington DC’s 2010 mock Internet election website,
resulting from a successful invited white-hat hack of that website, demonstrates this frailty.
2. Testing for “security” in anything involving electronics should involve red-team testing methods. Red teams are the good guys, sometimes called “white hat” hackers, who are hired to break the security of a system so that weaknesses can be fixed before the bad guys can exploit them.
3. State legislators should eliminate the existing provisions allowing voted ballots to be returned via the Internet. Note that, in addition to the security issues, this practice generally leads to a loss of anonymity of the ballot, contrary to the Colorado constitution (Article VII, Sect. 8).
4. State legislators should also adopt a resolution urging other states to resist allowing voted ballots to be returned via the Internet.
B. Beneficial Intervention in the Conduct of Colorado Elections
1. The Colorado State Legislative Audit Committee should call for a county-by-county performance audit of election system and supply contracts with private vendors. Consider saving state and county funds by renegotiating or cancelling contracts. Be sure to identify subcontractors. This evaluation needs to be applied especially to vendors involved in election equipment and processes.
2. We need a statutory guarantee that any money saved as a result of new election law stays in escrow to cover future election problems and unforeseen costs. Coloradans should not have to choose between road and bridge repair and fair and free elections.
Click here for section V: Enforcement and Jurisdiction: http://cfvi.us/?q=node/150